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This paper examines the concept of judicial independence in Kenya with a view to providing 
a deeper understanding of the challenges that work against its practical aspects. It uses a 
generalizable analytical framework to illuminate the relationship between judicial independence 
and specified essential factors normally considered as critical to strengthening the judicial 
independence in a democratic society. Descriptive method has been used to relate data to theory 
and to provide a coherent explanation on impediments to judicial independence in Kenya. The 
empirical analysis that draw on two datasets- the Afrobarometer and The CIRI Human Rights is 
provided to augment theoretical explanations. These datasets directly relate to Kenya, hence their 
usefulness. The work in this paper provides a detailed description of perceived challenges to 
judicial independence in Kenya and makes summaries on reasons why such challenges subsist. 
       
Introduction  
 
Building and maintaining a strong culture of judicial independence is of great importance to a 
democratic society. Indeed, judicial independence has been seen as fundamental, not just to the 
rule of law, constitutionality and human rights, but also in regard to globalization, free and 
efficient economic activity
2
. Scholars of judicial independence submit that it is not only one of 
the basic values which lie at the core foundation of the administration of Justice, but also very 
useful in creating an efficient and reliable judiciary (i.e Shetreet and Forsyth 2012). Judicial 
independence is also seen as an imperative element of ‘fair trial’ (Bado 2014). Further, judicial 
independence is also seen, not as an end to itself, but as a means to achieving ends. If judges are 
independent, they are essentially protected from undue influences from all possible agents in 
society that could undermine their impartiality. Consequently, judges are more likely to uphold 
the rule of law, preserve the separation of powers, promote the due process of law (Geyh 2008) 
and provide fair adjudication.      
While the desire to have an independent judiciary is fairly critical in many democratic 
societies, there are certain important factors (socio-political and economic) that impede this 
desire from being realized. Indeed, from a sociological perspective, we learn about a society 
better by understanding its systems and how they function, myriad conflicts that it presents, and 
a plethora of symbolic interactions that we experience in our day-to-day life. All these analytical 
frameworks are important in not only understanding legal systems, but also in describing and 
explaining contemporary challenges that bedevil judicial systems in a democratic society.  
It is important to realize that waves of social life appear to swirl incessantly (Cotterrell 1992) 
around judges and magistrates as they are also human beings who experience numerous 
everyday encounters with creditors, debtors, landlords, tenants, families (Cotterrell 1992), and 
other state actors or agents. All these are social realities, and it is particularly appropriate, 
therefore, to understand the work that judges and magistrates do as a ‘confrontation’ between 
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justice and social realities. The common sense perception is that the intentions and motivations 
of judges and magistrates are more likely to be influenced by social realities. From a 
functionalist perspective, each aspect of society is interdependent; from symbolic interactionist, 
people attach meanings to symbols and then they act according to their subjective interpretation 
of those symbols; and from conflict perspective, unequal groups of individuals usually have 
conflicting values and agenda. All these perspectives may help illuminate the elusive nature of 
judicial independence in Kenya’s democracy.  
The concept of judicial independence has been linked to essential aspects such as judicial 
reforms, judicial selection, constitutional safeguards and the war on corruption
3
. The purpose of 
this paper therefore is to examine the efficacy of these predictions in relation to judicial 
independence in Kenya. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: part 2 provides a detailed 
treatment of judicial independence in Kenya; part 3 focuses on the methodology; part 4 provides 
discussion and recommendations; and part 5 makes a conclusion.        
  
1. Judicial Independence in Kenya 
 
The concept of ‘judicial independence’ is fairly well recognized both by international 
resolutions and domestic laws of a modern democracy. The ‘United Nations Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary and the role of lawyers’ were endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in 1985 and 1990. Subsequently, the ‘Bungalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’ 
endorsed in 2003 recognizes “judicial independence as a prerequisite to the rule of law and a 
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.” Judges are therefore expected to uphold and exemplify 
judicial independence in both their individual and institutional aspects. Some legal scholars 
equate judicial independence to judicial power (Fleck 2014), while Bado (2014) opines that 
judicial independence is a prerequisite to fair trial.   
Despite its great importance, Kenya has not taken adequate concrete steps in terms of 
securing and preserving the concept of judicial independence. This might be attributed to the fact 
that practical aspects of judicial independence have proven elusive despite myriad competing 
theoretical predictions. A section of scholarly literature suggests that judicial independence can 
be achieved through broader institutional [legal and judicial] reforms (i.e Shetreet and Forsyth 
2012; Bado 2014; ICJ 2005), while another group of thinkers believes that judicial independence 
can be realized through a fair selection process of judges (see Bado 2014; Zoll 2012). Yet, there 
are those who believe that weaker ethical traditions, corruption and lack of appropriate code of 
conduct in the judiciary are potent factors in undermining judicial independence (Shetreet and 
Forsyth 2012; Ackerman 2007; Arvidson and Folkesson 2010; Chodosh 2012). Still, other 
scholars link judicial independence to fairness in the distribution of cases (see Bado and Szarvas 
2014). But each of these propositions suffer severe difficulties in evaluating the efficacy of their 
predictions because of the apparent lack of systematic empirical work to scientifically test and 
relay concrete results on these predictions. However, analyzing these predictions with a focus on 
the Kenya’s judiciary reveals great challenges that significantly affect the institutionalization of 
judicial independence in Kenya.       
Probably, the best starting point in understanding the nature of judicial independence in 
Kenya is to make reference to the Kenya’s Constitution and also examine related subjects of 
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much interest: the so called judicial reforms, judicial selection and judicial corruption. In one 
common approach, judicial independence is conceived of as “autonomy”
4
, where a judge is 
perceived to be independent and her decisions are free from undue influence from external forces 
or government (Rosenn 1987; Kornhausser 2002). However, some scholars view judicial 
independence as a two-dimensional concept: institutional independence and decisional 
independence.  
On the one hand, institutional or relational independence is mainly concerned with the 
‘autonomy’ and the capacity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government to resist 
encroachments from the political branches and thereby preserve the separation of powers
5
. For 
instance, Larkins (1996) views judicial independence as a scope of the judiciary’s authority as an 
institution in its relationship to other parts of the political system and society and its legitimacy 
as an entity entitled to determine what is legal and what is not. On the other hand, decisional 
independence concerns the capacity of individual judges to decide cases without threats or 
intimidation that could interfere with their ability to uphold the rule of law (Geyh 2008). 
Similarly, Becker (1987) takes the view that judicial independence is the degree to which judges 
believe they can decide and do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values and 
conceptions of the judicial role, in opposition to what others who have or are believed to have 
political and judicial power think about or desire in like matters
6
. 
Judicial independence reinforces the pillars of the rule of law by insuring that law applies to 
everyone, laws are enforced fairly, the justice system is fair, and laws are not arbitrary. It is a 
concept that some countries are likely to treat with a ‘rider’. While the practical aspect of judicial 
independence is likely to significantly enhance the doctrine of separation of powers, the political 
class in many countries are less likely to be comfortable with that norm. Unless the political 
climate and social consensus support judicial independence, then it is a concept that will only 
remain fanciful, but with little efficacy. In the words of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, “It is tremendously hard to create judicial Independence, and easier than 
most people imagine to destroy it.” The historical dominance of the executive branch over the 
judiciary in Kenya has made it difficult for the Kenya’s government to respect separation of 
powers and create a free, fair and independent judiciary. But Kenya is party to the general rules 
of international law
7
 and therefore, the Kenya’s government has a constitutional obligation to 
establish, respect and preserve the democratic principle of judicial independence.   
Principle 1 of the United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the independence of the judiciary 
asserts that, “The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in 
the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions 
to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.”
8
 It is against this background that the 
Kenya’s judiciary is established as an independent body by the Constitution. Article 160(1) of 
Kenya’s Constitution affirms that, “In the exercise of judicial authority, the judiciary, as 
constituted by Article 160, shall be subject only to this Constitution and the law and shall not be 
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subject to the control or direction of any person or authority
9
.” Apparently, in both spirit and 
text, the Kenya’s Constitution recognizes and affirms the principle of judicial independence as an 
important aspect in safeguarding the rule of law.  
Unfortunately, however, the actual realization of ‘judicial independence’ seems to be a pipe 
dream in Kenya. Scholars observe that although there is an international convergence, especially 
even in new democracies regarding what an ‘independent and an impartial court’ is, requirement 
for the implementation of judicial remains a challenge due to different legal systems in different 
countries.
10
 But one would argue that the practical challenges regarding the principle of judicial 
independence is not very much about the differences that exist in terms of legal systems, but 
rather has much to do with ‘cultural attitude’.
11
 To put it more bluntly, judicial independence 
should become a global culture in all legal systems and therefore the norms and standards of 
judicial independence should be upheld in all democracies. To give enough force and perspective 
to the aforementioned theoretical predictions, the sub-sections below provide analyses mainly 
on: Institutional (legal and judicial) reforms, judicial selection, judicial corruption and code of 
conduct, and constitutional safeguards. The idea is to evaluate whether or not these ‘essential’ 
aspects of creating the culture of ‘judicial independence’ have been effective or incompetent in 
strengthening the culture of judicial independence in the Kenya’s judiciary.  
Discussions in subsequent sub-sections use an overarching or a generalizable analytical 
framework known as ‘ideological polarization’ to provide a coherent relational perspectives 
between judicial independence and the aforementioned theoretical predictions. This ‘ideological 
polarization’ framework advances an important, new understanding of how the enforcement of 
judicial independence is more often than not problematic because of ‘ideological distance’ 
between groups of individuals, hence diverging relational interests of certain specific actors in 
society. In so doing, each discussion undertaken under each sub-section herein provides fresh 
insights into understanding the challenges that pose threats to judicial independence. To be more 
precise, the usage of the word ‘ideological’ derives from the word ‘ideology’, which for the 
purposes of this paper refers to inducement, [incentive, persuasion, a belief or sets of beliefs]. 
The analytical framework is oversimplified to enable ease of grasp and appreciation.    
Dalton (2008), Curini and Hino 2012, and Sartori (1976) have long concluded in their 
analyses of political parties that ideological polarization is one of the most established and 
discussed indicators of political party systems. This understanding can be extrapolated into the 
study of judicial systems. Every society is made up of fragmented and polarized groups of 
individuals on the basis of interests. For instance, sometimes judges want to uphold their code of 
ethics and apply rational and fair adjudication while political actors want to weaken existing 
legal norms or act with impunity to achieve selfish interests. There can never be a peaceful co-
existence between the two groups of individuals in society. They hold different belief systems 
and clearly, there is an ‘ideological distance’ between them. Their belief systems are distance 
apart. Political actors may then use intimidation and influence to force judges to co-opt or give in 
to their [politicians’] belief system-ill-designs. That is how judicial independence gets weakened, 
threatened and subordinated. Detailed treatment of this analytical frame is provided in the sub-
sections hereunder.    
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Figure 2.1 below provides an analytical model- a broad, generalizable analytical framework 
for purposes of appreciating challenges to judicial independence. It operates on the concepts of 
‘ideological polarization’ and ‘ideological distance’.   
     Fig. 2.1 Analytical Model: Generalizable analytical framework 
 
      Ethical obligations                                                        Political characteristics 
      [Integrity, Impartiality                                                      [Corruption, Partisanship 
      Equality, Diligence]                                                         Inequality, Intimidation]  
 
 
Panel (a) A= Judge                                                                         B= Political actor 
                                     Original ideological polarization [distance] 
 
 
Panel (b)                               A=Judge                            B=Political actor                 











The generalizable analytical framework in figure 2.1 above represents a phenomenon 
whereby there are potential rational actors. In other words it represents a rational ‘game’ between 
two sets of actors. In order for the game to play out, it makes the assumptions that there are a set 
of players, in this case: a judge and a political actor. The political actor could also be replaced by 
a litigant or other influential persons who want to restrain or influence justice. The other 
assumption is that all players are rational in the sense that each player understands any action 
that he or she takes would affect his expected benefit. Judges for example, are normally assumed 
to care about their reputation in the bench and therefore any decision they make should be seen 








the other hand also care about their reelection and their actions must be geared towards 
instrumental gains that would enhance their bid for reelection. Politicians care more about 
resources, amassing wealth, and serving their own interests and some interests of their 
constituents. For a politician to succeed in all these, he or she cannot be fully innocent of 
corruption, intimidation, inequality and partisanship. The other assumption that is made is that 
there is a set of action for each player and the final assumption is that, each player expects a set 
of payoffs.  
The game is simplified and moves as follows: a judge cares about his reputation in the bench 
and wants to maintain ethical obligations [integrity, impartiality, independence, competent] of 
the bench. On the other hand, political actor cares about his reelection and wants to create 
resources using all manner of tactics [corruption, intimidation, political influence]. The two 
actors are obviously at two distant, in fact, extreme poles of ideologies. If the judge is strictly 
professional and loath external influence in adjudication, he or she will resist any attempt by the 
political actor to narrow the gap of the ideological distance. If this gap is maintained and remains 
constant at its original as shown in panel (a) of figure 2.1, then the judge is more likely to uphold 
his decisional independence. No external influence will corrupt the decisional independence of 
members of the bench and a fair adjudication is therefore guaranteed. However, if the judge 
allows the ideological distance to reduce (panel b) to a level of ideological interaction shown in 
panel c of figure 2.1, then he is likely to indulge in corruption and impartiality and this would 
very likely interfere with his decisional independence, hence the threat to judicial independence.  
The ideal scenario for justice and social order in society would be when both actors hold 
moral norms and share similar ideologies: integrity, impartiality, wise, and respectful. In this 
case, whenever the two actors’ ideological distances reduces to a level of interaction (panel c), 
the product of that interaction is a ‘social order’ of justice. When there is harmony and cohesion 
of moral norms in society, then the moral obligation for upholding judicial independence is 
strengthened. Judicial independence can be said to mirror the social order of the society. But this 
is only possible when the society respects social norms. Durkheim, (1897/1997); Parson (1937), 
Merton (1942), and Dahrendorf (1958) had long laid emphasis on social norms as prerequisite 
condition for the establishment of social order in any society. Norms also can strongly restrain 
individuals from self-interests (Winter, Rauhult and Helbing 2012). According to Robert K. 
Merton, when moral norms are legitimized in terms of institutional values, societal norms then 
become moral consensus. Indeed, many of our daily activities are governed by social norms, 
which set the rules of how we ought to behave (Winter et al. 2012).     
As classic examples of how political actors can use intimidation to influence the bench, there 
are three important phenomena to draw on. Firstly, in the 2017 Kenya’s presidential elections in 
Kenya that was held on August 8, 2017, the electoral body (Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission) of Kenya declared the incumbent (Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta) to have won 
an election by 54 percent over his closest rival (Mr. Raila Odinga) who had obtained 45 percent. 
Mr. Odinga successfully launched an election dispute at the Kenya’s Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court nullified the presidential election terming it as “null and void” due to several 
irregularities and illegalities that failed to comply with the Kenya’s Constitution and the election 
laws
12
. After the Supreme Court verdict, President Kenyatta was angered and openly attacked the 
Chief justice and other judges of the Supreme Court whom he accused of deliberately nullifying 
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"Unajua hapo hawali nilikuwa Rais mtarajiwa, lakini sasa Maraga na watu wake wamesema 
hii ipotee, sasa Maraga na hao wakora wake wajue mimi ni Rais aliyekalia kiti. (As you all 
know, I had been declared as the president-elect, but Maraga (Chief Justice) and his people have 
decided that I lose it. But Maraga and his team of thugs should know that I am the sitting 
President)," Uhuru said at Burma Market.
14
 Then the following day at State house Nairobi, 
President Uhuru revisited the issue and shocked the public with his vicious attack of the Supreme 
Court. “President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto this afternoon used a nationally 
televised meeting to call as "stupid" the Supreme Court judges who nullified the August 8 
presidential election and threatened to deal with them if Jubilee is re-elected in the fresh election 
ordered by the court”. 
15
 “We shall revisit this thing. We clearly have a problem. Who even 
elected you? Were you? We have a problem and we must fix it,”
16
 a visibly angry Uhuru 
declared at State House, Nairobi, where he and Ruto summoned Jubilee governors and members 
of the county assembly from around the country. Kenya’s Citizen TV and KTN channels carried 
large part of the meeting live. 
The Supreme Court ordered for a fresh election within 60 days based on the Constitutional 
provision. However, the NASA coalition headed by Mr. Raila Odinga felt that the national 
electoral body was being unduly influenced by the executive to bungle elections in favor of 
President Kenyatta. The electoral body set the fresh presidential elections on October 26 and 
even before this date, there were again several petitions launched in the Supreme Court to call 
off and postpone the elections because the electoral body had not fully complied with the 
constitutional requirements for conducting a fresh election. Then on the eve of October 25, 
which was the day the Supreme Court had scheduled to hear the pre-election petition before the 
October 26 fresh elections, a driver cum security agent of the Deputy Chief Justice was attacked 
and shot by unknown people. Then on October 25 when the Supreme Court was supposed to sit, 
only 2 judges out of 7 showed up. The Chief Justice who turned up with one of the judges 
addressed the Court and said that one judge was reportedly unwell and hospitalized and the 
Deputy Chief Justice was attending to her official driver who had been shot the previous 
evening. However, the remaining three other judges were simply unable to come
17
. This saw the 
Supreme Court suffer an ‘artificial’ quorum hitch. So the petition hearing was called off and 
postponed to later date, obviously after the fresh presidential election that was to take place on 
October 26.         
Speculations were rife, however, that the judges were under threat by the executive and that 
is why there was a quorum hitch. The shooting of the Deputy Chief justice’s driver was also 
viewed by some citizens as part of the intimidation of the judiciary by the executive. Whether 
this was true or not, it remains unconfirmed. But regarding the President issuing direct threats to 
the judiciary was seen as an executive influence on the judiciary.   
In 2016, there were similar political threats to judicial independence by political actors. One 
of the notable threats was issued by the National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Duale who 

















was quoted in the national news media saying that he “will not be intimidated from presenting a 
notice of motion to discuss the conduct of Justice George Odunga in Parliament in January next 
year”
18
 [2017]. This followed censure by the Law Society of Kenya
19
, Chief Justice David 
Maraga and CORD principals over his criticism of Justice Odunga. Mr. Duale stated on social 
media that the Constitution under Article 94 gives him the legislative powers to file a motion to 
discuss the conduct of a sitting judge. “I will be on record as the first Member of Parliament in 
independent Kenya who will bring a motion to discuss the conduct of a sitting judge,” he 
declared. He indicated that as per the Standing Order 87, he intends to give notice of motion to 
discuss the conduct of Judge Odunga when house resumes in January 2017. He reiterated that 
any citizen can petition the Judicial Service Commission for the removal of the CJ or any other 
judge as per the constitution. “I would also want to remind CJ @dkmaraga that any citizen can 
petition the JSC for his removal or any other judge as per the constitution.” 
20
   
To summarize on how the analytical model in figure 2.1 works and based on the 
aforementioned happenings, it is apparent that acts of intimidation and threats by political actors 
are real. If judges stand by their ethical obligation and don’t allow themselves to be swayed by 
political threats or intimidations, then the concept of judicial independence is more hopeful. 
However, if judges allow the ideological distance between them to reduce to a level of 
interaction then judicial independence is likely to be threatened resulting in lack of justice and 
social disorder in society. Such ideological interactions should only be allowed when they are all 
purely based on moral norms, which guarantee justice and social order in society. This social 
order should be seen as the plinth or pedestal for underpinning judicial independence.   
In the next sub-sections, factors perceived to be influencing judicial independence: judicial 
reforms, judicial selection, judicial corruption and constitutional safeguards are given profound 
treatment. Discussions provided in each of the sub-sections are grounded in relevant sociological 
theories and the generalizable analytical model in figure 2.1 above. The main focus is to make 
logical arguments on each of these theoretical predictions and make conclusions on how they 
potentially influence judicial independence in Kenya. 
 
1.1 Judicial Reforms in Kenya 
 
In recent years, there has been a reform engine fueled by both international and local forces 
on the need to reform legal and judicial systems in in many developing countries. For instance, 
Kenya, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Zambia, 
Nigeria, Tunisia and many others have undertaken some form of legal and judicial reforms under 
the auspices of the World Bank and the United Nations.
21
 The overarching objective of these 
reforms is to strengthen judicial institutions. Kenya has therefore been ‘proactive’ on matters of 
judicial reforms. The initial judicial reforms started back in 1998 when the late Chief Justice Z.R. 
Chesoni appointed a committee of experts to look into a raft of issues that were bedeviling the 
judiciary: inefficiency, incompetence and corruption. The Chief Justice stressed that there was 
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need for the Kenya’s judiciary to inspire public confidence since the Kenyan public viewed 
judiciary with fear and suspicion. This called for the need to take appropriate steps to improve 
the image and performance of the judiciary in the administration of justice. These reforms were 
being fashioned against the spectacle of the historical dominance of the executive branch over 
the judiciary.  
It is conceivably necessary to bring into emphasis that the initial judicial reforms in Kenya 
failed to establish a framework for a truly independent judiciary. Little attention was paid to the 
principle of ‘judicial independence’ as far as the initial reforms were concerned. The fact that 
judicial appointment was still squarely the ambit of the President meant that the executive arm of 
government still had a lot of influence in the administration of the judiciary. In other words, the 
Kenya’s President remained a symbol of authority, influence and interaction in the judiciary. To 
give this phenomenon more perspective, symbolic interactionists believe that people attach 
meanings to symbols, and then they act according to their subjective interpretation of those 
symbols. In other words, since the President was perceived as the symbol of authority in the 
judiciary, it made it difficult for judges to be impartial, especially in adjudicating cases in which 
the executive had considerable interest.    
The second attempt at introducing judicial reforms in Kenya was in 2003 after a political 
transition from President Daniel Arap Moi to President Mwai Kibaki in 2002. Another 
committee of experts was established headed by Justice Evans Gicheru, Judge of the Court of 
Appeal. The task of this committee was to outline the modalities and oversee the implementation 
process of the previous committee’s recommendations and proposals. Corruption was seen as 
one of the major obstacles to justice delivery by the Kenya’s judiciary. Addressing corruption as 
an obstacle to the rule of law, the new government led by President Kibaki set up the “Integrity 
and Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary in Kenya to implement its policy known as 
“radical surgery.”
22
   This committee was headed by Justice Aaron Ringera who was also a 
judge of the superior court. Following the release of the Ringera Report in 2003, five out of nine 
Court of Appeal justices, 18 out of 36 High Court justices and 82 out of 254 magistrates were 
implicated as corrupt.
23
 The government then ordered the publication of their names, which then 
appeared in the national press.    
In a blatant display of raw, naked executive intimidation, the impugned judges and 
magistrates were issued a two-week ultimatum either to resign or be dismissed. They were never 
given a chance to mount a legal defense in fair and impartial proceedings. Some of them 
voluntarily opted to retire while a few others decided to challenge dismissal in court. In what was 
again seen as bare- knuckle interference of the executive on the Kenya’s judiciary, President 
Kibaki single-handedly appointed 28 acting High Court judges to replace the 18 who were 
dismissed. The appointment process raised serious concerns as to the ‘casual’ manner in which 
judges were appointed. Many people voiced concerns that the new judges may have been 
appointed in response to political, tribal and sectarian interests since there was lack of 
transparency or merit-based system in their appointment. This further fueled public 
disenchantment with the judiciary. The selection process undermined the public confidence in 
the quality of those named to the bench.
24
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In both instances of undertaking the so called ‘judicial reforms’, it is apparent that the 
Kenya’s judiciary was beholden to the executive interests and was more likely to pander to 
political partisans rather than being impartial. More emphatically, the spirit of judicial 
independence was subjected to a ‘mockery’. Based on the aforementioned, a mere mentioning of 
“Judicial Independence” in Kenya would probably fail to throb many hearts. But one may ask, 
why would this be the case? The spirit of judicial independence in Kenya seems likely, one of 
the most ‘tortured’ virtues of Kenya’s democratic principles. Despite the fact that judicial 
independence is being perceived as the first necessary ‘ingredient’ in the Kenya’s justice system, 
this great virtue has produced less full and complete effects of judicial efficacy.  
From a functionalist perspective, each aspect of society is interdependent and contributes to 
society’s functioning as a whole. If all goes well, the parts of society produce order, stability, and 
productivity. If all goes wrong, the parts of society then must adapt to recapture a new order, 
stability and productivity. Clearly, what can be deduced from the judicial reforms in Kenya is 
“all goes wrong” situation, instead of “all goes well” in regards to the independence of the 
judiciary. All goes wrong because the executive arm has undue control over the judiciary. The 
remedy required to restore stability and order to the judicial independence is for the Kenya’s 
executive to observe and respect the separation of powers doctrine.     
The third round of judicial reforms in Kenya came about with the promulgation of the new 
2010 Constitution. This is the Constitution that established the Supreme Court of Kenya and 
Hon. Justice Willy Mutunga was appointed as its President and the Chief Justice. “We found a 
judiciary that was designed to fail,” said Willy Mutunga, Kenya’s new chief justice, in 
a speech four months after his June 2011 confirmation to the post. “We found an institution so 
frail in its structures; so thin on resources; so low on its confidence; so deficient in integrity; so 




The reforms under the new Constitution mainly focused on establishment of new courts, 
strengthening system of administration and creation of an all-inclusive Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC), which is a body in charge of recruiting, appointing and disciplining judges. 
The first new Court that was established under this new Constitution is the Supreme Court of 
Kenya. Other courts established were the Environment and Land Court and the Employment and 
Labor Relations Court. Regarding strengthening system of administration, the Constitution 
created the position of Chief Registrar to improve service delivery. It also enabled the 
recruitment of 28 judges and additional magistrates through a vetting process that were seen as 
positive steps in the reform aimed at strengthening of justice in the country. But even with these 
reform efforts, their contribution to Kenya’s judicial independence has not been adequate and 
effective. Even if we take, for instance, the creation of an all-inclusive JSC as ‘ideal’ for 
recruiting competent and impartial judges, the composition of the newly established JSC is still 
problematic.  
Article 171 (1) of the Kenya’s Constitution asserts that, “There is established the Judicial 
Service Commission.”
26
 The Commission consists of the Chief Justice who is also the 
Chairperson of the Commission, one Supreme Court Judge elected by the judges of the Supreme 
Court, one Court of Appeal judges elected by the judges of the Court of Appeal, one High Court 
judge and one magistrate, the Attorney-General, two advocates elected by the members of the 
Statutory body responsible for professional regulation of advocates, one person nominated by the 
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Public Service Commission, and two non-lawyer representatives appointed by the President with 
the approval of the National Assembly. Out of the 11 members of this Commission, 4 of them 
are directly under the authority and control of the executive. The fundamental question that 
should then be asked is this: Does this purportedly all-inclusive JSC have the capacity to recruit 
and select impartial judges and strengthen judicial independence in Kenya’s democracy?     
The interesting thing about the Kenya’s Judicial Service Commission is that 5 of its members 
are drawn from the bench through an election process by other judges of the bench. As is the 
practice in other civil law jurisdictions such as Hungary and Turkey where judges are appointed 
through independent bodies, such as Judicial Councils comprised mostly of judges,
27
 the Kenya’s 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) serves a similar purpose of selecting judges. However, one 
would see that there is a lively debate regarding who should appoint judges to the JSC, who 
should be appointed and which procedure should be used? In Kenya, judges of the bench who 
are interested in becoming members of the JSC are required to campaign and pitch to be elected 
by their fellow colleagues. Just before leaving office in 2016, Chief Justice Willy Mutunga 
himself witnessed corruption in the judiciary when members of the bench were campaigning for 
new elections for the membership posts in the JSC. Justice Mutunga lamented that “elections to 
the country’s Judicial Service Commission had been riddled with bribery.” He observed that “It 
causes me a lot of pain that an election involving judges and magistrates would be corrupt,” 
Justice Mutunga said, adding that there was evidence to back up his allegations. “Can you 
imagine a judge bribing another judge so that they can vote for them?” he asked.
28
    
The question that one may ask is this: what should the Kenya’s Chief Justice have done after 
witnessing ‘first-hand’ corruption in the Judiciary? The answer to this question can be 
successfully traced to the Kenya’s Constitution. Indeed, if the Chief Justice was really disturbed 
about bribery and corrupt practices by members of the bench, then since by his own admission 
there was sufficient evidence to show that some judges were involved in bribery, then the first 
step he should have taken was to report the matter to the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) for 
disciplinary purposes. Article 172 (1) (c) of the Kenya’s Constitution asserts that functions of the 
JSC include: appointing, receiving complaints against, investigating and removing from office or 
otherwise discipline registrars, magistrates, other judicial officers and other staff of the judiciary. 
No sources has confirmed that the Chief Justice ever took any action against the corrupt 
members of the bench. This inaction by the Chief Justice undoubtedly leaved a dent on his 
ability to rein in corruption in the Judiciary and the President and the Chief Justice. It also 
became clear that the judiciary was condoning corruption by members of the bench. One would 
then wonder how a corrupt bench would fairly and competently adjudicate on corruption cases 
that come before them.   
Chapter 6 of the Kenya’s Constitution on Leadership and Integrity under Article 173 (2) (a) 
states that “The guiding principles of leadership and integrity include- selection on the basis of 
personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election in free and fair elections.” Better still, 
under Article 166 (2) (c) of the Kenya’s Constitution-“Each judge of the Superior Court shall be 
appointed from among persons who-have a high moral character, integrity and impartiality.”
29
 
This law requires that all appointed or elected State officers must be men and women of personal 
integrity, competence and suitability. This conceivably means that even the incumbent judges 
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(members of the bench) were appointed to the bench based on those moral and merit standards. 
If that was the criteria used by the JSC in appointing judges to the bench then it means that the 
practical aspects of personal integrity by members of the bench is also questionable. It sadly 
points to the fact that however fair the merit-based selection of judges is, it still does not usually 
translate into selecting judges of high moral standards to the bench.  
To summarize discussions on judicial reforms in Kenya, it is very clear from the 
aforementioned that Kenya has been able to undertake a raft of judicial reforms. However, in the 
process of undertaking these reforms, the executive is still seen as interfering in the judicial 
selection process. Also, while the Judicial Service Commission is said to be independent, it is not 
necessarily impartial because it consists of 4 members who are directly under the executive 
authority. Finally, it is apparent that even the already appointed judges who sit in the bench and 
serve as members of the Judicial Service Commission get their appointments to the JSC through 
bribery of their fellow judges to win elections to serve as a member of the JSC. This therefore 
implies that the executive interference on the judiciary, the impartiality of the JSC and corruption 
among judges are strong impediments to judicial independence and they cannot simply be 
defeated by judicial reforms. This makes judicial reforms in Kenya look like a weak exercise 
incapable of effectively strengthening judicial independence.  
Parsons (1951, 1971) had long observed that society is made up of systems and sub-systems. 
In fact, Parson emphasized that a society is a system of interdependent parts that tend toward 
equilibrium. This equilibrium means a state of harmony or calm in society due to social order. In 
this case, it can be said that the executive system, the judicial selection system and the judicial 
system all work together in quest for instituting judicial reforms. However, these systems need to 
function fairly in order to assure social order. For instance, democratic political systems must 
embrace and respect separation of powers and checks and balances. This enables our democratic 
systems to operate optimally, hence a society with no conflict. Parsons also observed equilibrium 
is attained through social control-that is, sanctions imposed either informally through norms and 
peer pressure or through formal organizations, such as courts of law.      
Drawing on Parsons’ insights, it can be said that corruption among judges can be mitigated 
formally or informally through peer pressure. The Chief Justice, after witnessing first-hand 
judicial corruption among judges should have reported the matter to the JSC for formal action. 
At the same time, members of the bench including the Chief Justice should have informally 
castigated their colleagues for engaging in bribery for purposes of winning election to serve as 
members of the JSC. In this particular discussion, it can be emphatically said that each system 
has an obligation to demonstrate manifest functions. According to Merton 91968), manifest 
functions are actions that contribute to equilibrium that are tended to be recognized by members 
of society.  
To summarize on this discussion, Solomon (2007) observed that it is both perplexing and 
incomprehensible why widespread, ambitious and costly institutional reforms lead only to 
limited results. The answer to addressing institutional failure could probably be linked to cultural 
attitudes, especially if they subordinate societal moral norms. In applying the analytical model in 
figure 2.1, it can be said that when systems that lack moral norms reduce their ideological 
distance to the level where their ideologies interact (panel c), then the outcome of that interaction 
is a social disorder. For instance, if you have an executive system that is impartial, a judicial 
selection body that is impartial and a judiciary that is impartial, then there is very little guarantee 
for the institutional independence of the judiciary. Judicial reforms in Kenya must aim at 
building a strong culture of judicial independence.               




1.2 Judicial Selection in Kenya 
 
Methods of judicial selection and their impact remain a contested debate. There are about 
four basic models of judicial selection: contested elections, legislative appointment, merit 
selection and gubernatorial appointment.
30
 In some countries, however, the head of state appoints 
judges as a formal duty, but nomination or actual selection is done by political institutions such 
as legislature, executive or the judiciary itself.  In Thailand, for example, each judge is appointed 
by the King, but only after the candidate has passed a judicial exam presided over by the courts, 
and then serve a one-year term of apprenticeship. This type of system can be considered one in 
which the judiciary plays the primary role, notwithstanding formal appointment by the King. 
31
 
Different countries with common law or civil law legal systems may use one or a variety of 
the above methods depending on the stipulated law on judicial appointment. The U.S. system, 
which is a common law system, for example, uses election for some state judges, and 
gubernatorial appointment in some states, but not at the Federal level. In Hungary, which is a 
civil law system, a merit-based selection is normally used through some version of appointment 
by a judicial council is used.
32
 Likewise, Kenya, which is a common law system also uses a 
merit-based selection through an ‘independent’ body known as the Judicial Service Commission.   
Whichever method that is being employed to select judges, there is no single agreed method 
that is perceived to be superior to the others. They all have merits and demerits and no particular 
method can be said to guarantee judicial independence. Selection through an electoral system 
could be good for legitimacy and accountability reasons, but could be bad in the sense that it 
involves partisanship and therefore is unlikely to insure judicial independence. This method may 
also raise biasness and prejudice concerns. Merit-based selection could be good in terms of 
appointing the most qualified legal experts to the bench, but this does not in itself guarantee 
fairness and impartiality by the bench and is therefore also does not guarantee judicial 
independence. Appointment by political institutions such as the legislature could also be good in 
terms of legitimacy and accountability, but it might also raise concerns of pandering to political 
interests and thus less likely to insure independence of judges. This makes the practical 
realization of ‘judicial independence’ a contemporary challenge in many democracies around the 
world. 
Article 166(1) of the Kenya’s Constitution asserts that: “The President shall appoint (a) the 
Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and subject to the approval of the National Assembly; and 
(b) all other judges, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Article 171(1) of the Constitution establishes the Judicial Service Commission and prescribes its 
membership, which includes 4 judges of the superior courts (High court, Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court), one Magistrate, the Attorney-General, 2 advocates, 1 member of the Public 
Service Commission and 2 members appointed by the President with the approval of the 
National Assembly. It is apparently clear that out of these 11 members, 4 of them are directly 
under the executive authority or control. Even though the Kenya’s JSC is perceived to be an all-
inclusive in its membership, questions still arise as to whether it is capable of impartially 
selecting impartial judges and fair enough to make fair selection. 
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Although the JSC is seen to consists of highly qualified individuals from different 
professions (legal and non-legal professionals), the selection process is to a large extent driven 
by politics. For instance, in regard to the appointment of the Chief Justice or the Deputy Chief 
Justice, the new Kenya’s 2010 Constitution clearly stated that the JSC shall advertise for vacant 
positions in the judiciary then only qualified individuals are allowed to apply for vacant slots. 
Upon receiving applicants’ requests, the JSC is required to carefully go through all the 
applications and then shortlist the most qualified candidates. Once the shortlisting has been done, 
the JSC sends out messages to all the shortlisted candidates to appear for an interview. During 
the interview, the past history, performance and conduct of each candidate is brought to public 
scrutiny and the candidate has to defend his or her past record.  
Upon the completion of all interviews, the JSC was required by the Constitution to forward 
only one name for the position of Chief Justice and only one name for the position of the Deputy 
Chief Justice to the President for appointment. However, due to political interests in judicial 
affairs, the majority ruling party (Jubilee coalition) made amendment to this critical part of the 
Constitution and the JSC will now be required to forward 3 names of candidates to the President 
for appointment instead of one name. This new law came into effect on December 15, 2015. 
Once the President makes his appointment of his preferred individual, he then forwards that 
name to the National Assembly and the Senate for approval or disapproval. In most cases, 
Kenya’s Parliament usually approves Presidential appointees.   
The Law Society of Kenya (LSK), which is a professional organization of all registered 
Kenyan advocates faulted the Kenya’s National Assembly for making amendments to the law 
and thereby making it possible for the executive to interfere with the independence of the 
judiciary. The LSK went to Court to challenge the constitutionality of the new law arguing that it 
amended critical sections of the Judicial Service Act therefore interfering with judicial 
independence. “The Act as amended fundamentally upsets the doctrine of Separation of Powers 
between the three arms of government and should be suspended because the independence of the 
judiciary is at stake. The Constitution has clearly stated that the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC) shall forward one name of a qualified person to the President for nomination as Chief 
Justice or Deputy Chief Justice but the Act has come up with a formulation requiring JSC to 
forward three names,” said LSK through senior counsel Nzamba Kitonga. Unfortunately, 
Kenya’s court declined to suspend law giving President the appointment power and the LSK lost 
the suit.
33
   
According to international standards, judges must be appointed through strict selection 
criteria through fair and transparent process, which must be effective in safeguarding against 
appointments for wrong motives. International standards also require the authorities in charge of 
judicial selection and appointment of judges to be independent of the executive and legislative 
powers. Based on these standards, the Kenya’s method of judicial selection and appointment still 
falls below the international standards. Although Kenya has an ‘independent’ body (JSC) 
mandated to recruit judges and magistrates, the body is not purely delinked from the executive 
and the legislative influence and is therefore less likely to guarantee fair selection and judicial 
independence.  
In comparison to other jurisdictions, Hungary under civil legal system uses Judicial Council, 
which is a body equivalent to Kenya’s Judicial Service Commission. The Venice Commission, in 
its Judicial Appointments Opinion concluded that an “appropriate method for guaranteeing 
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judicial independence is the establishment of a Judicial Council, which should be endowed with 
constitutional guarantees for its composition, powers and autonomy and that such a Council 
should have a decisive influence on the appointment and promotion of judges and disciplinary 
measures against them.” Since Hungary is a member of the European Union, its judicial selection 
method is bound by the Venice Commission.    
The question that really matters is whether these judicial selection bodies (Judicial Service 
Commission or Judicial Council) can really guarantee a fair selection process that would 
eventually strengthen judicial independence. In Kenya, we have the so called merit-based 
selection of judges. Without being cynical, the process of merit-based selection is justifiable and 
needs to be encouraged. However, due to symbolic interaction factors, this process is less likely 
to engender efficacious outcome, hence its inability to guarantee judicial independence. A better 
way to understand this is to consider the fact that Kenya is a multi-ethnic society and the country 
appears to be deeply divided along ethnic lines. Using the analytical framework of symbolic 
interactionism, Kenyans tend to favor members of their own ethnic tribe or political group more 
than those from outside their ethnic tribe or political group. Belonging to a particular ethnic 
community or political party is seen as a symbol that can either earn somebody a job or deny 
him, irrespective of his or her competence, academic qualifications and stellar credentials. 
Substantial subjectivity usually plays out and tends to override objectivity when it comes to “in-
group” and “out-group” symbols of identity. This also applies to the judicial selection committee 
in Kenya.  
Although the Kenya’s Judicial Service Commission is said to be an ‘independent’ body and 
consists of professionals, the selection process cannot be said to be fully innocent of symbols of 
tribe and partisan politics. Strict professionalism is less likely to play a bigger role when it comes 
to judicial selection in Kenya. This is because members of the selection committee subtly apply 
the concept of ideological distance to candidates during the interview, and they make favorable 
approval of the candidate whose ideological distance (tribe and partisan politics) is closer to 
theirs. In essence, ideological polarization exists even among members of the selection 
committee and selection of candidates is based on the ideological distance. There is need, 
however, for merit plan selection system to be more transparent and strictly nonpartisan for its 
efficacy to be realized.                 
When judges are selected based on ideological distance (ethnicity, political affiliation), that 
is, when their identity ideology interacts with some members of the selection committee, then 
they are likely to reciprocate that gesture by establishing cooperation with those who selected 
him. This cooperation, based upon reciprocity, continues and each party has an incentive to 
cooperate for mutual benefits. The judge feels obligated to cooperate because he doesn’t want to 
‘Burn Bridges’ while the selection party also feels obligated to cooperate due to anticipated 
[future] litigation payoffs. In other words, each party has an incentive to cooperate
34
. In 
summary, merit-based judicial selections that are affected by ideological distance are more likely 
to influence the decisional independence of judges. Any time the ideological distance is reduced 
to a level of ideological interaction involving a judge and a member of the selection committee 
as is shown in figure 2.1 above, then professionalism gets subordinated and the whole merit-
based system is turned into partisan-based system. This cannot assure the decisional 
independence of a judge.  
To summarize on this discussion, when the executive system’s ideology, judicial selection 
system’s ideology and the judicial system’s ideology are based on moral norms, even if their 
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ideological distance is reduced to a level where they interact as seen in panel c of figure 2.1, then 
the outcome of that interaction will always be a social order that contributes to equilibrium in 
society. Institutional independence of the judiciary can be said to be that social order, hence 
equilibrium. 
 
1.3 Judicial Corruption and Code of Professional Responsibility in Kenya 
 
Maintaining the integrity and improving the competence of the bench to meet the highest 
standards of adjudication should be the unequivocal ethical responsibility of every judge. 
Fundamentally, good character in the members of the bench is essential to the preservation of 
judicial dignity and integrity of courts. This requires that judges should be of good moral 
character. A judge’s fiduciary duty should be of the highest order and he or she must not 
represent interests adverse to justice as doing so would amount to travesty of justice. Neither 
should judges allow their private interests to conflict with those of litigants. It is very likely that a 
financial interest in the outcome of litigation might result in the maladministration of justice in 
courts. It is a fair characterization of judge’s responsibility to stand as a shield and to ward off 
corruption. Corruption according to Black’s Dictionary is characterized as: illegality; a vicious 
and fraudulent intention to evade the prohibitions of the law; moral turpitude or exactly opposite 
of honesty involving intentional disregard of law from improper motives; an act done with an 
intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.
35
       
To provide more perspectives on the issue of ethics, judges need to uphold both normative 
and practical ethics. On the one hand normative ethics ask questions such as: what is the best 
way, broadly understood, to live [as a judge]? Are there general principles, rules, guidelines that 
we should follow, or virtues that we should inculcate, that help us distinguish right from wrong 
and good from bad?
36
 On the other hand, practical ethics ask questions such as: how should we 
behave in particular situations [as judges]? When should we tell the truth? Under what 
circumstances can or should we resist gifts or inducements? How should we relate to the political 
and social environment around us? Most important, however, judges need to understand that 
ethics is primarily a matter of practice-and not a matter of abstract moral knowledge.
37
 
Inadequate knowledge of normative ethics is more likely to weaken the enforcement of practical 
ethics and thus resulting into loose morals such as indulgence in corruption by judges. In fact, 
judges should find acts of corruption or bribery sufficiently repulsive that they would thereby be 
motivated to refrain from indulging.  
Scholars agree that a non-corrupt judiciary is a fundamental condition for the endorsement of 
rule of law and the ability to guarantee basic human rights in society. The judiciary must 
therefore be an independent and fair body that fights corruption, not the other way around.
38
 
Further, the effects of corruption might be detrimental and more likely to break down the very 
core of rule of law and this may lead to corrupt judges neglecting fundamental principles such as 
equality, impartiality, propriety and integrity (Arvidson and Folkesson 2010). The question that 
must be grappled with is whether the Kenya’s judiciary has taken the right steps in ensuring that 
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mechanisms of judicial independence are strengthened so as to prevent corruption within the 
judiciary itself.   
Prior to the 2002 political transition from President Daniel Arap Moi to President Mawai 
Kibaki, the Kenya’s judiciary was widely known to be corrupt. In fact, when the new 
government took office (the Kibaki administration), it addressed corruption as an obstacle to the 
rule of law and vowed to deal with the vice. To be seen to be wedding rhetoric with action, the 
new government set up the “Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary in Kenya” 
to implement its policy known as “radical surgery.” The report of this committee saw several 
judges retiring due to implications in various corrupt practices. While this measure was seen as a 
step in the right direction to clean up the Kenya’s Judiciary of corruption and to restore public 
confidence in the Judiciary, it would only last for a few months if not weeks. This was the case 
because the intended judicial reforms failed to establish a framework for truly independent and 
accountable judiciary.   
In May 2002, an Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts visited Kenya 
to give recommendations and proposals on the Judiciary and in their report, they indicated that 
there was rampant corruption in the Kenya’s Judiciary and bluntly stated that “complaints of 
corruption exceeded level that can be expected or tolerated.
39
 Further, in a survey conducted in 
September 2002 by the International Commission of Jurists to (ICJ) assess the perceptions of the 
Kenyan public (consumers of justice) on judicial reforms and the impact on the administration of 
justice in Kenya, 92 percent of the responses indicated that the civil division of the Court was 
corrupt followed by criminal division at 83 percent, commercial division at 73 percent and 
family division at 42 percent. 
40
 A similar ICJ report in 2005 concluded corruption in the 
administration of justice, including the judiciary, has been a serious impediment to the rule of 
law in Kenya. The report indicated that “while corruption is a principal obstacle to the proper 
functioning of an independent judiciary in Kenya, anti-corruption measures themselves must be 
implemented in a way that strengthens and does not weaken the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary.”
41
   
The new 2010 Kenya’s Constitution under Article 173 (1) established a fund to be known as 
the ‘Judiciary Fund’ and gave the Chief Registrar of the judiciary the responsibility of managing 
the fund. Article 173 (2) of the 2010 Constitution states that: “The Fund shall be used for 
administrative expenses of the Judiciary and such other purposes as may be necessary for the 
discharge of functions of the Judiciary. In essence, the 2010 Constitution gave the Kenya’s 
judiciary some latitude on how to manage its own finances without strict regulations. What 
followed in 2013 was a shock to the nation. Chief Registrar of the judiciary, Gladys Boss Shollei 
and seven senior officials were charged with massive corruption including irregular procurement 
of building materials
42
.       
Judiciary Chief Registrar Gladys Shollei was then sacked by her employer, the Judicial 
Service Commission (JSC), over allegations that she misused Sh2.207 billion. The JSC president 
Chief Justice Dr. Willy Mutunga said she (Shollei) had been fired for incompetence, 
misbehavior, violation of the code of conduct for judicial officers, insubordination and violation 
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of Chapter Six and Article 232 of the Constitution. Article 232 asserts the values and principles 
of public service, which include (a) high standards of professional ethics and (b) efficient, 
effective and economic use of resources. In a detailed statement, Dr Mutunga said Mrs Shollei 
had admitted 33 allegations in which Ksh1.7 billion “is at risk or has been lost”. Mrs Shollei 
allegedly also denied another 38 allegations in which Sh250 million was lost. The JSC stated that 
her responses to allegations involving Sh361 million were “mixed, flippant and flimsy”. “Having 
fully appreciated the allegations served on her, and having read the responses, and noting that 
she elected to appear in person before the commission, and after in-depth interrogation of all 
issues, it is the unanimous resolution of the commission that the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary 
is hereby removed from office with immediate effect,” said Dr Mutunga
43
. 
In its 2015 Corruption Index, Transparency International (TI) ranked Kenya as a highly 
corrupt Country in the East African region, ahead of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. 
Kenya was ranked 139 out of 167 countries.
44
 According to the International Commission of 
Jurists report of 2002, corruption had taken root in every sector of Kenya that even the Judiciary 
could not escape it.
45
 “Various reports published, especially from mid-eighties to date have 
indicated that corruption is very serious in the Judiciary. Thus the Judiciary is no longer viewed 
to be above suspicion and consequently, many people no longer look up to it as the protector and 
guarantor of citizens’ rights and freedoms. On many numerous occasions, government officials 
and the wealthy have used this institution to get illegal orders for their own selfish interests 
without due consideration to the law and or people’s rights.”
46
 It is therefore little surprising that 
a few years ago, Mazingira Institute, (a domestic transnational organization and an activist 
progressive participant in local and global social process), launched a vigorous campaign against 
judicial corruption using the slogan “Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?” This clearly 
shows how judicial corruption in Kenya had gotten out of hand.  
Just recently in 2016, one of the Kenya’s Supreme Court justices was accused of allegedly 
receiving bribes to influence an election petition case before the Supreme Court.  The Judicial 
Service Commission received complaints of the alleged offense and accordingly advised the 
Kenya’s President to constitute a tribunal to investigate the accused judge
47
. The President then 
appointed a seven-member tribunal to investigate Justice Philip Tunoi’s conduct in connection 
with an election petition lodged by Ferdinand Waititu against his opponent, Nairobi Governor 
Dr. Evans Kidero
48
. It was alleged that Justice Tunoi received a bribe of $2 million to rule in 
favor of Governor Evans Kidero. The then Law Society of Kenya (LSK) President, Mr. Eric 
Mutua reiterated that “If the allegations against the judge are true, then the judge must have 
taken this money on behalf of at least two or three other judges” sitting on the bench. This case 
was seen as the first of its kind to test the credibility of the Kenya’s Supreme Court which was 
established when the country promulgated a new constitution in 2010. Article 168 (1) (b) of the 
Kenya’s Constitution asserts that “A judge of a Superior Court may be removed from office on 
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the grounds of–a breach of a code of conduct prescribed for judges of the Superior Courts by an 
Act of Parliament.”  
Unfortunately, however, even before the sitting tribunal completed its hearing on the matter, 
it got disbanded. This was because there was a concurrent case going on at the Supreme Court 
lodged by Justice Philip Tunoi challenging the decision of the JSC to retire him at the age of 70, 
which was the official retirement age as per the new 2010 Constitution, instead of being retired 
at the age of 75, which was the official retirement age of judges according to the old 
Constitution. Justice Tunoi had argued that since he was hired under the old Constitution which 
provided for his retirement age at 75, the new Constitution’s age requirement of 70 should not 
affect him. The Supreme Court, however decided to uphold the Court of Appeal decision, which 
had decided that justice Tunoi’s retirement age should be at 70 and not 75. When the judge was 
being investigated, his age was already past 70 with some months. The tribunal decided to 
disband without completing its work because it now treated justice Tunoi as a retired judge who 
the Tribunal did not have any authority or a mandate to investigate. Based on the aforementioned 
happening, whether or not it was true that justice Tunoi accepted bribe from Governor Evans 
Kidero remained mere speculation since the tribunal did not give its verdict
49
.          
The Kenya’s new Chief Justice, David Maraga, who came into office in 2016 and having 
only stayed in office for a few months admitted there was corruption in the Judiciary. According 
to Justice Maraga, 10 percent of the staff in the judiciary including judges and clerks were 
involved in graft which was tainting the name of the institution
50
. Up to this far, a lucid account 
has been provided of alleged bribery, corruption and misconduct by judges and staff members of 
the Kenya’s judiciary. The focus hereafter then should be on how the potent of corruption in the 
Kenya’s judiciary influences (impedes or weakens) its judicial independence.   
There are contradicting and perhaps, stimulating views as to whether it is the presence of 
judicial corruption that impedes judicial independence or the other way round, which is, presence 
of judicial independence impedes judicial corruption. Some people see judicial corruption as 
responsible for undermining the rule of law. One the one hand, some scholars argue that the 
presence of judicial corruption compromises the capacity of the judiciary to be an independent 
and impartial arbiter
51
. Arvidsson and Folkesson (2010) makes interesting observation on the 
relationship between corruption and judicial independence and concludes that corruption 
weakens judicial independence
52
. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the presence 
of judicial independence weakens judicial corruption
53
. “Bearing in mind the independence of 
the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial 
independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption 







 Views expressed by Mr. James Sitienei, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya and an attorney of the defunct 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. The views were made during his 2010 presentation on “Corruption in Kenyan 
Judiciary” at the University of Passau, Germany.     
52
 Amelie Arvidsson and Emelie Folkesson. Corruption in Judiciary: Balancing Accountability and Judicial 
Independence. 2010. 
53
 Juan Carlos Donoso. A means to an End. Judicial Independence, Corruption and the rule of law in Latin America. 
2009. 




among members of the judiciary” (United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 11)
54
. 
Apparently, even according to the UN Convention Principles, judicial independence is critical to 
preventing judicial corruption.  
To summarize on this discussion, judges cannot be said to be some “Angels” siting in the 
bench. They are also human beings who experience numerous everyday encounters with 
creditors, debtors, landlords, tenants, families (Cotterrell 1992), and other state actors or agents. 
They also want to enjoy their freedom and rights of investing and owning properties. Even 
though their conduct of judges is strictly regulated by code of ethics, it is very likely that 
normative conflict may arise and if the judge is not very careful about preventing himself from 
co-optation, then he would be in essence allowing the ideological distance between himself and 
the other actors (political agents, creditors, business partners, family members) to significantly 
reduce to a level of ideological interaction. When that happens, then the ethical norms of the 
judge may get subordinated and the judge will be co-opted in the immoral norms in society. It is 
only moral norms that play an important role in establishing social order in society. Immoral 
norms may, however, establish cooperation of actors whose intentions are inimical to social 
order. This phenomenon may lead to threats on the decision independence of the judge. 
 
1.4 Constitutional Safeguards to Judicial Independence in Kenya 
 
Kenya has been able to provide constitutional safeguards for members of the bench by 
ensuring that all judges enjoy security of tenure and earn better salary so that they can 
comfortably do their job without fear or favor. Article 167 of the Kenya’s Constitution asserts, 
“Tenure of office of the Chief Justice and other judges.” This law requires judges to work until 
they reach the age of 70 then they can retire. The usual retirement age for all public servants in 
Kenya is at 60 years. Also, Article 160 (4) says that subject to Article 168 (6) of the Constitution, 
the remuneration and benefits payable to, or in respect of, a judge shall not be varied to the 
disadvantage of that judge, and the retirement benefits of a retired judge shall not be varied to the 
disadvantage of the retired judge during the lifetime of that retired judge. Further, Article 160 (5) 
of the Kenya’s Constitution says that, “A member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or 
suit in respect to anything done or omitted to be one in good faith in the lawful performance of a 
judicial function.        
These constitutional safeguards serve to embolden judges so that they can do their work with 
courage and diligence. However, the aforementioned discussion reveal that even with all these 
constitutional protection of judges and the judiciary, the Kenya’s executive and legislative arms 
still have unfettered nerves to berate judges and intimidate the judiciary. This further makes the 
plinth of judicial independence in Kenya to be on shaky ground. Unleashing attacks on the 
judiciary, especially if it is being done by the executive serve as strong signals or symbols of 
threat to judicial independence. It reveals that both the judiciary and the executive are not on the 
one side of moral norms. As the analytical model in figure 2.1 reveals, if the ideological distance 
is at panel (a), then the executive issues threats to reduce that distance to a level of panel (c) 
where it can actually force the judiciary to give in to its (executive’s) ill-designs. The outcome of 
this co-optation is likely to be a social disorder (impartiality), hence lack of independence of the 
judiciary. 
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Descriptive research method has been employed for the treatment of the topic of this paper. 
This method is more attractive because the main interest here is to be able to describe specific 
behavior in regards to judicial independence as they occur in the Kenya’s society. According to 
Aggarwal (2008) descriptive research is very useful for gathering of information about prevailing 
conditions or situations for the purpose of description and interpretation
55
. This type of research 
method is not simply used for amassing and tabulating facts but includes proper analyses, 
interpretation, comparisons, identification of trends and relationships. 
 
3. Data and Analysis 
 
Specifically, datasets used draw on two different survey research design conducted by the 
Afrobarometer, and The CIRI Human Rights Data. Survey research design is important as it 
employs applications of scientific method by critically analyzing and examining the source 
materials, by analyzing and interpreting data, and by arriving at generalization and prediction
56
. 
Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conduct public attitude 
surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 
countries in Africa. It collects and publishes high-quality, reliable statistical data on Africa. Two 
batteries of (survey) questions that specifically focus on judicial corruption in Kenya were 
selected. The first question asked respondents their perception on corruption among judges and 
magistrates in Kenya, while the second survey question asked respondents about their trust on 
courts of law in Kenya. These two questions are considered important in unravelling the 
perceived level of judicial corruption in Kenya for the period between 2005 and 2011. 
Afrobarometer has an online statistical tool for data visualization and it was effectively used to 
visualize data presented in section 3.2 below. The data has mainly been visualized in form of bar 
charts and pie charts and thus provides a summary of the entire question regarding perceived 
judicial corruption in Kenya.           
The CIRI Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on 
government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 2002 countries annually 
from 1981-2011. In particular, the dataset contains a variable known as INJUD (independence of 
the judiciary), which indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from 
other external sources of power. Since the topic of study focuses exclusively on Kenya, 
observations on the variable INJUD are extracted from this dataset to illustrate the extent of 
judicial independence in Kenya for the period between 1981 and 2011. The illustration is lucidly 
provided using raw data in a table format.  
 
3.1. Statistical Results 
 
Statistical results presented in figures below contain two survey questions from the 
Afrobarometer. The first question was asked in rounds 3 to 6 of the Afrobarometer survey and it 
mainly examined perception on corruption involving judges and magistrates in Kenya from 2005 
to 2015. Responses to this question are presented in the bar charts below. The second question is 
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focusing on the perceived trust in courts of law in Kenya from 2005 to 2015. Responses to this 
question are provided in pie charts below.      
Fig. 3.2.1(a) Perception on corruption among judges and magistrates in Kenya   
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R3 2005/2006) on judicial corruption in Kenya 
The bar chart above represents round 3 of public responses on perceived corruption among 
judges and magistrates in Kenya between 2005 and 2006. A total of 1,278 respondents took the 
survey and 135 of them (10.5 percent) felt that none of judges and magistrates were corrupt, 600 
(46.7 percent) believed that some judges and magistrates were corrupt, 290 (22.7 percent) 
believed that most judges and magistrates were corrupt, 67 (5.3 percent) felt that all judges and 
magistrates were corrupt, and 187 (14.6 percent) answered that they were not aware whether 
judges and magistrates were corrupt.    
Fig. 3.2.1(b) Trust on Courts of Law in Kenya 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R3 2005/2006) on trust on courts in Kenya. 
The pie-chart in fig. 3.1 (b) above represents Afrobarometer survey R3 conducted between 
2005/2006 results. The survey question asked a total of 1,278 respondents how much they trusted 
courts of Kenya. 127 of the respondents (9.9 percent) said they don’t trust courts of law at all, 
360 (28.2 percent) said they trusted courts of law just a little, 412 (32.2 percent) said that they 
somewhat trust courts of law, 299 (23.4 percent) said they trusted courts of law a lot, while 74 




(5.8 percent) answered they didn’t anything about courts of all and 6 (0.5 percent) failed to 
answer.  
Fig.3.2.2 (a) Perception on corruption among judges and magistrates in Kenya. 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R4 2008/2009) on judicial corruption in Kenya 
The bar chart above represents round 4 of public responses on perceived corruption among 
judges and magistrates in Kenya between 2008 and 2009. A total of 1,104 respondents took the 
survey and 63 of them (5.7 percent) felt that none of judges and magistrates were corrupt, 563 
(51 percent) believed that some judges and magistrates were corrupt, 278 (25.2 percent) believed 
that most judges and magistrates were corrupt, 113 (10.3 percent) felt that all judges and 
magistrates were corrupt, 86 (7.8 percent) answered that they were not aware whether judges and 
magistrates were corrupt, and 2 (0.2) failed to answer.    
Fig. 3.2.2 (b) Trust on Courts of Law 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R4 2008/2009) on trust on courts in Kenya 
The pie-chart in fig. 3.2 (b) above represents Afrobarometer survey R4 conducted between 
2008/2009 results. The survey question asked a total of 1,104 respondents how much they trusted 
courts of Kenya. 225 of the respondents (20.3 percent) said they don’t trust courts of law at all, 
379 (34.3 percent) said they trusted courts of law just a little, 308 (27.9 percent) said that they 
somewhat trust courts of law, 156 (14.1 percent) said they trusted courts of law a lot, while 25 
(2.2 percent) answered they didn’t anything about courts of all and 12 (1.1 percent) failed to 
answer.    
Fig. 3.2.3 (a) Perception on corruption among judges and magistrates in Kenya  





Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R5 2011/2013) on judicial corruption in Kenya 
The bar chart above represents round 5 of public responses on perceived corruption among 
judges and magistrates in Kenya between 2011 and 2013. A total of 2,399 respondents took the 
survey and 172 of them (7.2 percent) felt that none of judges and magistrates were corrupt, 1,305 
(54.4 percent) believed that some judges and magistrates were corrupt, 516 (21.5 percent) 
believed that most judges and magistrates were corrupt, 152 (6.4 percent) felt that all judges and 
magistrates were corrupt, 251 (10.5 percent) answered that they were not aware whether judges 
and magistrates were corrupt, and 3 (0.1) failed to answer.    
Fig. 3.2.3 (b) Trust on Courts of Law 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R5 2011/2013) on trust on courts in Kenya 
The pie-chart in fig. 3.2.3 (b) above represents Afrobarometer survey R5 conducted between 
2011/2013 results. The survey question asked a total of 2,399 respondents how much they trusted 
courts of Kenya. 281 of the respondents (11.7 percent) said they don’t trust courts of law at all, 
564 (23.5 percent) said they trusted courts of law just a little, 874 (36.5 percent) said that they 
somewhat trust courts of law, 587 (24.5 percent) said they trusted courts of law a lot, while 10 
(0.4 percent) answered they didn’t anything about courts of all and 82 (3.4 percent) failed to 
answer.    
Fig 3.2.4 (a) Perception on corruption among judges and magistrates in Kenya  





 Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R6 2014/2015) on judicial corruption in Kenya 
The bar chart above represents round 5 of public responses on perceived corruption among 
judges and magistrates in Kenya between 2014 and 2015. A total of 2,397 respondents took the 
survey and 183 of them (7.6 percent) felt that none of judges and magistrates were corrupt, 1,228 
(51.2 percent) believed that some judges and magistrates were corrupt, 590 (24.6 percent) 
believed that most judges and magistrates were corrupt, 198 (8.3 percent) felt that all judges and 
magistrates were corrupt, 193 (8.0 percent) answered that they were not aware whether judges 
and magistrates were corrupt, and 4 (0.2) failed to answer.    
Fig. 3.2.4 (b) Trust on Courts of Law 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (R6 2014/2015) on trust on courts in Kenya 
The pie-chart in fig. 3.2.4 (b) above represents Afrobarometer survey R6 conducted between 
2014/2015 results. The survey question asked a total of 2,397 respondents how much they trusted 
courts of Kenya. 298 of the respondents (12.4 percent) said they don’t trust courts of law at all, 
613 (25.6 percent) said they trusted courts of law just a little, 920 (38.4 percent) said that they 
somewhat trust courts of law, 459 (19.1 percent) said they trusted courts of law a lot, while 2 (0.1 
percent) answered they didn’t anything about courts of all and 105 (4.4 percent) failed to answer.    
Based on the above statistics and illustrations, it is apparent that the Kenya’s Judiciary is not 
innocent of corruption and that makes it vulnerable to influence by powerful forces (political and 
economic agents) in society, hence its inability to remain impartial in the administration of 
justice. In the paragraph below, a similar illustration of perceived level of judicial independence 
in Kenya is provided. The variations in the level of judicial independence could be attributed to 
change of political administration that comes with its own level of impunity. If the level of 
impunity is so high under any administration, then that is very likely to translate into a weaker 
judicial power and lack of judicial autonomy and vice versa.      
Table 3.2 below represents raw data on the perceived level of judicial independence in Kenya 
from 1981 to 2011. The raw data is extracted from “The CIRI Human Rights Dataset, graciously 




provided by David Cingranelli, David Richards, and Chad Clay (2014). The CIRI Human Rights 
Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 15 
internationally recognized human rights for 2002 countries annually from 1981-2011. Since the 
focus of this paper is on judicial independence in Kenya, the CIRI dataset is of great relevance 
since it elaborates on the perceived level of judicial independence for consecutive years 
amounting to 30. A specific variable coded as INJUD is used in the CIRI Dataset to 
operationalize a variable called “judicial independence”. INJUD is indexed on a scale of 0-2 with 
0 indexing “not independent”, 1 indexing “partially independent”, and 2 indexing “generally 
independent”.   
Table 3.1. Level of perceived judicial independence in Kenya: 1981-2011   
 
Source: The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (1981-2011). 




As is abundantly clear from table 3.1 above, between 1981 and1987, the Kenya’s judiciary 
was perceived as generally independent, except in 1986 when it was seen as partially 
independent. Between 1988 and 1991, the Kenya’s judiciary was viewed as partially 
independent, an indication that it was beginning to lose some judicial power. The years between 
1992 and 1995, the Kenya’s judiciary was perceived as not independent, and this simply means 
that it had substantially lost its constitutionally guaranteed judicial autonomy. In the years 
between 1996 and 2004, the Kenya’s judiciary was again viewed as partially independent, a very 
optimistic indication that the judiciary was clawing back its lost power. However, between 2005 
and 2011, the Kenya’s judiciary was again perceived as not independent, a clear indication that 
some powerful forces were out to frustrate the justice system. 
 
4. Discussion and Recommendations 
 
Factors considered to be affecting the culture of judicial independence in Kenya, and in this 
case, judicial reforms, merit-based selection of judges, judicial corruption and constitutional 
safeguards of the judiciary reveal considerable theoretical challenges that are likely to impede 
the practical aspects of judicial independence. To mitigate these challenges, the Kenya’s 
authority needs to work on ways of entrenching moral norms that would consistently engender 
and assure social order in society. While these factors are important for predicting the concept of 
judicial independence, there is a dearth of empirical work to ascertain their efficacy. The 
available data is so disjointed and scattered and thus makes it impossible to conduct rigorous 
analysis. Also, theories linking judicial independence to other variables-essential aspects of 
judicial independence that have been discussed here are still fairly less developed and therefore a 
lot of empirical observations and testing are still required in order to augment their explanatory 
power.    
It would be absolutely naïve not to mention a number of caveats in relation to the shaping of 
this work. Firstly, the analytical model used in figure 2.1 may not be a perfect model to provide a 
logical reasoning behind challenges to moral norms and social order in society, and in this case, 
the challenges to the practical aspects of judicial independence. It cannot be ruled out that the 
model probably needs further modification in order to make it more reliable and consistent when 
it comes to testing theory. Secondly, the dataset used in section 3 (The Afrobarometer Dataset 
and The CIRI Human Rights Dataset) are not well synchronized. While the CIRI dataset is 
available from 1981to 2011, the Afrobarometer Dataset used is from 2005 to 2015, thus making 
the analysis of the pattern of relationship between corruption and judicial independence in Kenya 
more difficult. There needs to be dataset from a single entity or source that provides all the 
variables for predicting judicial independence. Finally, the work presented here does not make 
any claim of causality between the predictor variables and judicial independence. However, it 
provides logical descriptions that provides a platform for more rigorous explanatory work and 
hypotheses testing.    
5. Conclusion 
Judicial independence is critical to the administration of justice in a judicial system. 
However, it has become an elusive concept to practice. Despite predictions that judicial 
independence can be secured through judicial reforms, merit-based selection of judges, 
elimination of judicial corruption, and constitutional safeguards for the judiciary and judges, all 
these essential aspects still do not guarantee an autonomous judiciary. The best way to realize 
judicial independence is to first and foremost entrench moral beliefs in society, so firmly 




grounded, such that it becomes impossible to change such beliefs. Once a society entrenches 
moral beliefs, then societal norms become respected and social order automatically follows. As it 
is now, society is replete with conflicting ideological positions to the extent that unpopular 
ideological positions are being reinforced through political influence and corruption so as to 
insubordinate popular ideologies. When unpopular ideologies corrupt and overpower popular 
ideologies, social disorder sets in and that is why even if judicial reforms are implemented, 
merit-based judicial selection is enforced, institutions to fight against corruption are created and 
constitutional safeguards are provided, all these essential aspects remain ineffective in assuring 
judicial independence. In a nut shell, the culture of judicial independence can only be founded on 
a pedestal of entrenched societal moral beliefs. Lack of this moral pedestal contributes 
significant threat to judicial independence and that is likely the main reason as to why 
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